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Do High Gas Prices Sell Small Cars? 
Performance: 
An Empirical Study of the Impact of Fuel Prices on Automotive Sales  
 
NATE WHEATLEY
I. Introduction 
 
How much is a gallon of gas this week?  Only some 
people bother to ask that question and an even 
smaller number actually care months later how  
much gas costs today.  A recent study by Kurani and 
Turrentine (2004) clarifies the relatively blasé 
attitude most people appear to have about fuel 
economy and it is stated thusly: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmentalists complain that Americans care too 
little about the relatively poor mileage of our vehicle 
fleet.    In a report by the World Resource Institute 
presented at the National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory, the United States had the lowest average 
fuel economy of all nations compared at a projected 
25 miles per gallon for 2007 (Sauer 2005).  Other 
nations‘ standards were planned to be much higher 
for the same time period, including Canada at 30 
MPG, China at 35, the EU at 42, and Japan tops the 
list with a stratospheric 46 MPG (Sauer 2005).  The 
United States is reliant on imports for 57% of net 
petroleum needs, and 32% of all petroleum is 
destined for transportation use (United States 
Energy Information Administration 2009).  With 
this in mind, it is important to ask in what ways the 
United States can lower its petroleum imports.  One 
method is to reduce petroleum usage, and a big 
target for reductions is the United States‘ vehicle 
fleet.  Various proposals to accomplish this have 
included fuel taxes (Dahl 1979 p427-432), mileage 
taxes (Fullerton 2002 p135-157), engine-size taxes 
(Fullerton 2002 p135-157) and emissions taxes 
(Jansen 1999 p379-396).  Most of these would apply 
on the consumer side, as federal gas guzzler taxes 
already exist to ―discourage the production and 
purchase of fuel inefficient vehicles‖ (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency).  For 
clarification, these taxes are collected directly ―from 
car manufacturers or importers,‖ not consumers, 
although such an entity may pass along the tax in the 
vehicle‘s purchase price (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency 2009).  Fuel 
economy is mandated on the producer side, but what 
about consumers?  We always say that we want more 
miles to the gallon, especially when gas prices jump.  
But do American consumers put their money where 
their mouths are?  When gas prices rise, do vehicle 
sales change accordingly?  This paper explores the 
impact of fuel prices on vehicle sales by model from 
2005 to 2009 at quarterly intervals across four 
major auto manufacturers: Ford, Toyota, Honda and 
General Motors. 
 
Between 2005 and 2009, the average nominal price 
for regular unleaded fuel in the United States 
changed drastically from a low of 159 cents/gallon to 
a high of 405.4 cents/gallon (United States Energy 
Information Administration 2009).  Generally, 
economics demands that inflation be accounted for 
and prices converted from nominal to real using the 
CPI or similar index, but based on research by 
―It is clear that for most households, fuel expenditures are not tracked over time, rather 
are perceived through refueling events. That is knowledge of fuel costs appears to more 
commonly be episodic and ephemeral; the largest group of people can recall the price of 
their last tank, and last gallon, of gasoline. However they do not sum or integrate these 
costs over time, and we observed that the certainty with which even these numbers were 
offered appeared to depend on how long ago the last refueling event occurred. Refueling 
done in the past few days appear to provoke quicker, more confident responses than 
refueling done earlier‖ (Kurani and Turrentine 2004). 
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Kurani and Turrentine (2004), it is the belief of this 
author that because of the way consumers relate to 
fuel prices, use of ―real‖ prices is not necessary.  
Consumers ―do not sum or integrate [fuel] costs over 
time, and we observed that the certainty with which 
even these numbers were offered appeared to 
depend on how long ago the last refueling event 
occurred‖ (Kurani and Turrentine 2004).  In fact, 
―knowledge of fuel costs appears to more commonly 
be episodic and ephemeral; the largest group of 
people can recall the price of their last tank, and last 
gallon, of gasoline‖ not the cost of gas last month, 
last year or when the most recent vehicle purchase 
was made (Kurani and Turrentine 2004).  
Consumers do not view fuel prices beyond the last 
gallon or last tank, so it is reasonable to conclude 
consumers respond to nominal fuel prices, rather 
than real fuel prices, at the time of a vehicle 
purchase.  Hence, the regressions that will be 
performed for this study will contain nominal fuel 
prices. 
 
 
II. Theory 
 
―Economic theory predicts a direct link between fuel 
prices and SUV sales, and more broadly between fuel 
prices and vehicle sales‖ since a vehicle is a product 
which requires a constant input in order to obtain 
value from it (McManus 2007).  Many products 
require some kind of ―maintenance payment‖ in 
order to do what the consumer purchased the 
product to do.  Homes need repair, computers use 
electricity, stoves require natural gas and college 
courses are only useful when the student has the 
necessary textbooks.  Thus, when a consumer 
purchases a product, it would be rational to consider 
the cost of inputs to the product, as opposed to only 
the upfront sticker price of the product.  More 
specifically, a ―vehicle's services (mobility) require 
the ongoing input of fuel‖ which the rational 
consumer should consider before buying (McManus 
2007).  Further, when the price of fuel goes up, 
vehicle owners are worse off since the price of an 
input they require now uses more of their 
discretionary income than it did before.  When 
consumers are worse off, they are less likely to 
spend, and consequently this would have a negative 
impact on auto sales.  Gas costs more so people feel 
poorer.  What does this do to vehicle sales?  Theory 
suggests two effects: a negative income effect 
depressing the sales of all vehicles and a substitution 
effect which results from the higher price of the 
―ongoing input,‖ shifting sales away from those 
products needing more of this input to products 
using less (McManus 2007). 
 
These effects will alter the demand for automobiles.  
Both will work to reduce the demand for large 
vehicles as a result of an increase in fuel prices, but 
will have ambiguous effects on small vehicles.  
Income effects occur as a result of decreased 
consumer wealth.  When people are worse off, they 
purchase fewer goods and services regardless of 
what those goods and services might be.  Cars are an 
expensive item, so decreased incomes due to high 
fuel prices will tempt consumers to ―make do‖ with 
the vehicles they have by putting off or even 
scrapping intended vehicle purchases.  Substitution 
occurs when consumers swap one product for 
another which is functionally equivalent in the eyes 
of the substituting consumer.  Theoretically, some 
vehicles that would have been purchased are not, 
and in other cases consumers choose a different 
vehicle than the one they were originally planning 
on.  In both cases changes in demand are a reaction 
to fuel prices, pushing down sales of vehicles in the 
aggregate but also shifting sales among different 
models—some gain while others lose.   
 
 
Figure 1: Hypothesized Change in Demand for Cars by Size 
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 The graphs in Figure 1 above detail what happens to 
demand ―D‖ for Large Cars and Small Cars as fuel 
prices increase.  The ―D2‖ line on both graphs 
represents the income effect, while the ―D3‖ line on 
both graphs represents the hypothesized 
substitution effect.  As fuel prices rise, consumers 
are relatively poorer since fuel costs soak up more of 
their disposable income.  Demand across all vehicles 
drops from D to D2 due to the income effect.  
However, since Large Cars and Small Cars differ in 
their required input of fuel, worse-off consumers 
will, if forced to purchase a vehicle, choose vehicles 
which are less expensive to run.  Thus, some sales of 
large vehicles which would have taken place had fuel 
prices remained constant do not, while sales of small 
cars increase as reflected in the shift from D2 to D3 
on both graphs. 
 
If consumers do in fact engage in substituting 
behavior, then an increase in fuel prices should shift 
demand for large cars to the left and shift demand 
for small cars to the right.  Increasing fuel prices 
should then always decrease the sales of large cars 
but increase the sales of small cars if the substitution 
effect does in fact dominate the income effect. 
 
I. Literature Review 
 
Past research has focused on the demand for 
gasoline as a function of household variables (Kayser 
2000), the economic impact of fuel economy 
standards such as CAFE (Portney et al. 2003), how 
attempts to increase gas prices in the United 
Kingdom through taxes have impacted demand for 
greater fuel efficiency (Witt 1997), how changing fuel 
prices affects market share of varying types of 
vehicle classes (Busse et. al. 2008), whether using 
rational choice theory in discussion of how 
consumers relate to fuel economy is appropriate 
(Kurani and Turrentine 2004) and finally 
commentary on the motivations of hybrid vehicle 
owners (Kurani and Turrentine 2004).  There are 
two studies which concern themselves with a direct 
link between sales and gas prices using multiple 
regression (Witt and Busse).  The first is dated as 
well as slightly off-topic, being from 1997 and 
discussing the United Kingdom (Witt 1997).  The 
second is more relevant, because it is both recent 
and focused on the United States (Kurani and 
Turrentine 2004).  Turrentine and Kurani ran a 
series of interviews for their 2004 study which 
covered fuel economy but the report contains no 
statistics and has a generalizability problem since 
the sample size was 57 households in California and 
thus not representative.  Therefore my paper will try 
to take the discussion in a slightly different direction 
by looking at American sales data, which leaves a 
large amount of room for analysis. 
 
Kayser‘s measurement of household demand for 
gasoline found ―the price elasticity of gasoline 
demand is low in the short-run‖ in addition to noting 
that ―income is a significant explanatory variable for 
the fuel efficiency of a household‘s car fleet‖ (Kayser 
2000 p331-348).  This suggests gasoline taxes might 
or might not achieve the desired goal of reducing 
fuel consumption.  Kayser further writes that ―there 
are clear differences in gasoline demand across the 
population‖ depending on several factors (all of 
which increase consumption) including living in a 
rural area, having no public transportation nearby 
and having both members of the household 
employed (Kayser 2000 p331-348).  His conclusion 
for policy-makers was to treat different households 
differently.  The working poor would be hit 
especially hard by a gasoline tax or carbon fee, but 
with this knowledge formulation of policy could take 
these factors into account to compensate those who 
would be unfairly disadvantaged (as determined by 
those writing the law) for the higher prices they 
would pay.   
 
Portney‘s research, on the other hand, discussed the 
overall social-welfare impact of the Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy standard, while 
simultaneously writing of the rationale for fuel 
economy standards in general (Portney et al. 2003).  
On the grounds of macroeconomic stability against 
oil price shocks, mitigating the market power of 
unfriendly states controlling oil markets, concern for 
the environment and market failure regarding fuel 
economy, Portney‘s study supports some kind of 
intervention above and beyond what the market 
would provide on its own (Portney et al. 2003).  
There is also discussion of unintended consequences 
of the law, including the possibility of double-
accounting for externalities by imposing standards 
on top of fuel taxes which theoretically might take 
care of the problem of gasoline overconsumption 
(Portney et al. 2003 p203-217).  Further, by lowering 
the cost of driving by improving mileage, CAFE may 
actually be causing people to drive more, mitigating 
potential carbon and fuel use savings (Portney et al. 
2003).  The conclusion is that fuel economy 
standards could improve welfare in the future, but 
―mak[ing] a watertight case for tightening fuel 
economy standards now, based on externality 
grounds alone‖ is ―difficult‖ (Portney et al. 2003 
p203-217).  Interestingly, alternatives to the CAFE 
standard are also discussed.  A proposal not 
mentioned in any other literature found thus far 
consists of tradable ―fuel economy credits‖ (similar 
to a cap-and-trade scheme to control pollution) 
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which would both permit the government to set a 
goal for fuel economy while allowing theoretically 
more efficient market forces to decide how to get 
there (Portney et al. 2003 p203-217).  Reducing fuel 
consumption can also be accomplished by reducing 
driving.  Insurance where ―charges would be based 
on annual miles driven‖ as opposed static monthly 
bills would reduce fuel demand, with the caveat ―that 
[the policy] provides no incentives to improve fuel 
economy, as it penalizes miles driven rather than 
fuel use‖ (Portney et al. 2003 p203-217).  The final 
suggestion is raising or altering gasoline taxes.  ―The 
problem with gasoline taxes, of course, is not 
economic but political,‖ and noting the relatively 
inelastic demand for gasoline, a high tax might only 
bring a small benefit (Portney et al. 2003 p203-217).  
Continuing with the topic of gasoline taxes, a study 
by Witt of drivers in the UK concluded ―petrol price 
increases [whether from market forces or taxes] will 
have little effect on fuel efficiency‖ (Witt 1997).  In 
fact, Witt cites another study which ―provided some 
US evidence that corporate average fuel economy 
standards [are] more effective than petrol prices in 
influencing vehicle manufacturers to achieve 
increases in fuel economy‖ (Witt 1997).  Though fuel 
taxes look like a solution to consumption problems 
on paper, they neither discourage driving nor 
influence suppliers in a significant enough manner 
to accomplish their goal within reasonable limits. 
 
Busse et. al. have created a preliminary study 
evaluating changes in market share of various 
vehicle ―segments‖ (which are defined as Compacts, 
Midsize, Luxury, Sporty Cars, SUVs, Pickups and 
Vans), found ―a meaningful shift in the composition 
of segment shares in response to a gasoline price 
change that is well within the magnitude of changes 
seen in the last decade‖ (Busse et. al. 2008).  
Further, there was ―no statistically significant effect 
for luxury or sporty cars‖ because either ―luxury and 
sporty cars both gain and lose as a result of gasoline 
price changes‖ or ―fuel efficiency is simply not a 
decision criterion for the purchase of luxury cars and 
sporty cars, or that buyers who buy such cars are 
fairly insensitive to the price of gasoline, perhaps 
because they are wealthier than the average car 
buyer‖ (Busse et. al. 2008).  In either case, this study 
should show similar results: change in the sales of 
vehicles should be linked to fuel prices.  If a vehicle 
is ―luxurious‖ and/or ―sporty‖ then such changes will 
be minimal, if they appear at all.  It is important to 
note that some of these models, especially sporty 
vehicles, require premium gasoline.  This paper will 
only deal with vehicles which use Regular Unleaded 
(which does include some luxury vehicles such as 
Cadillacs, but excludes the Chevrolet Corvette). 
 
Kurani and Turrentine (2004) have done extensive 
research on consumer attitudes regarding vehicles.  
The principal finding of their 2004 study on 
California households was that ―we can no longer 
afford the luxury of the assumption that so many 
consumers are behaving in an economically rational 
manner that such rationality is the sole sufficient 
basis for policy formulation and analysis‖ with 
regard to fuel economy (Kurani and Turrentine 
2004).  Either consumers are engaging in ―limited‖ 
rationality, or more radically, they assert that should 
gasoline prices rise, ―buyers respond in surprising, 
i.e., non-economically rational, ways‖ (Kurani and 
Turrentine 2004). 
 
IV. Empirical Model 
 
In order to test the impact of fuel prices directly on 
vehicle sales, one would expect many controls for 
factors such as brand, engine type/size, vehicle class 
and more since there is indeed great variance among 
the hundreds of choices in the market for 
automobiles.  However, this study uses sampling 
selection to minimize the number of control 
variables required by breaking vehicles down by 
make, then model, and only after applying these 
sampling controls running regressions against sales 
data.  For example, comparing a Honda Civic to a 
Chevy Silverado would require many controls for 
vast differences between the vehicles.  However, 
holding a 2005 Honda Civic against another 2005 
Honda Civic is not going to yield too many 
differences.  While the 2010 Civic compact car is 
available in three basic trim levels (each split into 
two sub-levels), Honda‘s reported EPA ratings do 
not vary between the trim levels (American Honda 
Motor Co. 2009).  Even the variance between 
automatic transmissions and manual transmissions 
is very small, 2 MPG or less depending on whether 
the comparison is city mileage or highway mileage 
(American Honda Motor Co. 2009).  Such discussion 
is included  to show that intra-model fuel economy 
variance is small enough to be ignored, in this 
author‘s opinion.  Fuel prices only matter because of 
how much fuel a vehicle uses, and since the 
difference in fuel usage is negligible for the purpose 
of this study all vehicles within a single make/model 
can be compared against each other on this 
particular attribute, because it does not vary enough 
to warrant special attention.  The goal is to explain 
vehicle sales by using the price of fuel.  For the 
purposes of this study vehicle sales have been 
sampled (not averaged) on a quarterly basis (Jan-
Apr-Jul-Oct).  However, since fuel prices change 
during the same period when vehicle prices (as 
measured by MSRP) do not, they have been 
averaged on a quarterly basis.  All vehicles in the 
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sample set run on regular fuel and the mean 
difference between the price of ―regular unleaded‖ 
and ―regular unleaded reformulated‖ which is 
required in certain areas to reduce pollution (United 
States Environmental Protection Agency 2008) is 
5.7% since November 1994 when the EPA began 
measuring the price of Reformulated Gas (United 
States Energy Information Administration ) the 
price of gas used will be regular non-reformulated 
unleaded.  This is the best source of fuel price data 
available—it is the most comprehensive freely 
available database for this type of information. 
 
Vehicle sales have been pulled from publically-
available information, mostly press releases from the 
automakers themselves.  Because different 
automakers make available varying data-sets in 
varying forms, the period of analysis for each 
automaker is slightly different.  However, the period 
of analysis for each vehicle within a single 
automaker is constant.  It would be ideal to have a 
larger sample of automakers as well as a longer time 
period, but because of the paucity of freely available 
data before 2005, this is not possible.  Further, not 
all automakers make sales data readily available—
Chrysler comes to mind for their scatter-shot 
approach to sales figures which are handled by a 
third party.  Only a year‘s worth of data is available 
for this automaker, which led me to exclude them 
from the sample.  The final weakness of this data set 
is that it had to be generated by copying data from 
Adobe PDF files and Excel files into a single master 
database, so transcription errors are possible. 
 
The model itself is extremely simple since it has been 
established that sampling selection controls for 
relevant vehicle-characteristic variables, in addition 
to the fact that intra-model variance (leather trim 
high-end versus cloth trim basic, for example) does 
not contribute to significant variance in fuel 
economy. 
0 1Sales = (Fuel Price)+  
 
In this model, Sales is the monthly sale of a specific 
car model sampled quarterly between the time 
periods of January 2005 to April 2009.  The time 
period varies between automakers due to the 
availability of data but within each automaker, the 
time period is held constant.  Fuel prices are 
measured in nominal cents per gallon, averaged 
across each quarter.  Figure 2 shows the difference 
between ―quarterly average‖ and ―monthly‖ gas 
prices is not large. 
 
 
Figure 2: Nominal Gas Prices, 2004 to 2009 
 
 
Note: The large number of ―zero‖ points in the Quarterly Average is due to an Excel aberration that I cannot fix; it 
thus insists on displaying ―zero‖ cents per gallon on all months that are not the quarterly sample (i.e. not January, 
April, July, October
 
V. Results  
 
 
An abbreviated table without all of SPSS 18‘s output is produced in Table 1 below, divided by vehicle size. 
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Table 1: Regression Results 
Dependent: Quarterly Sales by Model, Independent: Average Quarterly Gasoline price 
Small Cars 
Model Constant Coefficient T-Statistic Adj. R-Squared Time Period 
Chevy Aveo 183.085 17.902*** 3.006 0.321*** Jan05-Apr09 
Honda Civic -1473.796 105.660*** 3.780 0.425*** Jan05-Jul09 
Honda Civic Hybrid -586.861 11.242** 2.765 0.270** Jan05-Jul09 
Toyota Yaris 26.838 25.808*** 3.397 0.448*** Jan06-Jul09 
Toyota Corolla 14037.627 55.506 1.596 0.100 Jan06-Jul09 
Midsize Cars 
Model Constant Coefficient T-Statistic Adj. R-Squared Time Period 
Chevy Cobalt 3073.074 47.182* 1.888 0.131* Jan05-Apr09 
Ford Focus 3776.687 40.601* 2.028 0.147* Jan05-Jul09 
Ford Mustang 8114.829 8.239 0.480 -0.045 Jan05-Jul09 
Honda Accord 2014.554 105.174*** 4.516 0.519*** Jan05-Jul09 
Toyota Camry 14379.328 77.845** 2.162 0.208** Jan06-Jul09 
Toyota Prius Hybrid -1812.673 51.217*** 3.167 0.392*** Jan06-Jul09 
Large Cars 
Model Constant Coefficient T-Statistic Adj. R-Squared Time Period 
Buick LaCrosse 5917.196 -4.74 -0.353 -0.054 Jan05-Apr09 
Cadillac CTS 1895.588 10.298** 2.2292 0.200** Jan05-Apr09 
Chevy Impala 15911.901 18.712 0.810 -0.021 Jan05-Apr09 
Ford Crown Victoria 2833.246 7.162 1.121 0.014 Jan05-Jul09 
Ford Taurus 19264.210 -40.129 -1.424 0.060 Jan05-Jul09 
Toyota Avalon 4892.582 0.113 0.003 -0.077 Jan06-Jul09 
Small and Midsize SUVs/Crossovers 
Model Constant Coefficient T-Statistic Adj. R-Squared Time Period 
Chevy Equinox 8000.814 -0.511 -0.031 -0.062 Jan05-Apr09 
GMC Envoy 7823.595 -12.409 -0.774 -0.024 Jan05-Apr09 
Ford Escape -42043.565* 228.101*** 2.912 0.294*** Jan05-Jul09 
Honda Pilot 8039.765 6.442 0.403 -0.049 Jan05-Jul09 
Honda CRV 5738.589 36.264** 2.871 0.287** Jan05-Jul09 
Honda Element 3256.485 -0.495 -0.077 -0.058 Jan05-Jul09 
Toyota RAV4 8908.905 13.929 1.163 0.025 Jan06-Jul09 
Toyota FJ Cruiser 3622.118 -0.711 -0.074 -0.083 Jan06-Jul09 
Toyota 4Runner 4927.638 2.476 0.182 -0.074 Jan06-Jul09 
Toyota Highlander 6527.068 10.027 0.982 -0.003 Jan06-Jul09 
Full-Size SUVs 
Model Constant Coefficient T-Statistic Adj. R-Squared Time Period 
Cadillac Escalade 1797.301 2.214 0.497 -0.046 Jan05-Apr09 
Cadillac Escalade ESV 692.280 1.083 0.498 -0.046 Jan05-Apr09 
Chevy Suburban 4726.238 3.667 0.329 -0.055 Jan05-Apr09 
Chevy Tahoe 7840.381 9.585 0.468 -0.048 Jan05-Apr09 
Chevy Avalanche 3762.522 0.595 0.061 -0.062 Jan05-Apr09 
Ford Expedition 8394.319 -7.663 -0.485 -0.044 Jan05-Jul09 
Ford Explorer 15809.306 -18.361 -0.595 -0.037 Jan05-Jul09 
Toyota Sequoia 801.995 4.772 1.610 0.102 Jan06-Jul09 
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Table 1 Continued 
Trucks / Vans 
Model Constant Coefficient T-Statistic Adj. R-Squared Time Period 
Chevy Colorado 8761.974 -7.025 -0.444 -0.050 Jan05-Apr09 
Chevy Silverado 41601.824 12.529 0.161 -0.061 Jan05-Apr09 
GMC Canyon 2581.416 -2.690 -0.640 -0.036 Jan05-Apr09 
GMC Sierra 12108.059 10.989 0.426 -0.051 Jan05-Apr09 
Ford F-Series 52881.994 3.434 0.035 -0.059 Jan05-Jul09 
Ford Ranger 6898.475 -0.139 -0.010 -0.059 Jan05-Jul09 
Ford E-Series 9806.482 9.222 0.610 -0.036 Jan05-Jul09 
Honda Odyssey Minivan 6129.400 22.771 1.492 0.064 Jan05-Jul09 
Honda Ridgeline 2099.543 3.972 0.699 -0.031 Jan05-Jul09 
Toyota Sienna Minivan 6915.607 12.593 1.066 0.010 Jan06-Jul09 
Toyota Tacoma 2WD 3415.066 13.634* 1.803 0.138* Jan06-Jul09 
Toyota Tacoma 4WD 3649.243 6.713 1.746 0.128 Jan06-Jul09 
Toyota Tundra -1971.137 48.143** 2.419 0.257** Jan06-Jul09 
* - Significant at 0.10 level   ** - Significant at 0.05 level   *** - Significant at 0.01 or better 
 
 
It is interesting to note that the hypothesis of dueling 
effects which would have seen the coefficient of gas 
prices on large vehicles show up as negative and the 
coefficients on smaller vehicles be positive as fuel 
prices increase did not hold.  In fact, with many 
larger vehicles the sign of the coefficient was the 
opposite of what the hypothesis predicted.  This was 
not a wash, however, as a different effect was 
observed.  Sales of smaller vehicles are quite 
responsive to changes in nominal fuel prices.  For 
each cent increase in fuel prices, all Small and 
Midsize Cars have positive coefficients, which was as 
predicted.  All but two (Toyota Corolla in the Small 
Cars category and the Ford Mustang in the Midsize 
Cars category) are significant.  All Small Car 
regressions which have significance reach the 0.01 
level or better.  The best example of a smaller car‘s 
sales being explained by nominal fuel prices is 
actually a Midsize Car, the Honda Accord sedan.  
The regression itself explains 51.9% of the variance 
while maintaining significance at the 0.01 level.  This 
general trend carries across all four automakers: the 
bigger the vehicle, the lower the significance and 
explanatory power of fuel prices in the sales of said 
vehicle.  There are two stand-outs in the chart above: 
the Toyota Tundra and Toyota Tacoma 2WD trucks 
have statistically significant coefficients and 
unexpected positive signs.  While outliers are not 
something to ignore, further analysis is beyond the 
scope of this paper and is best saved for future 
research. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The hypothesis of substitution effects outweighing 
income effects was sustained, since regressions for 
smaller and midsized vehicles generally had the 
expected coefficient direction and were statistically 
significant.  However, there were many unexpected 
signs on coefficients for larger cars, though very few 
rose to any level of statistical significance.  These 
findings support the 2008 study of Busse et. al. who 
found significant changes in market share of varying 
types of vehicles with a specific note that ―Overall 
there is a meaningful shift in the composition of 
segment shares in response to a gasoline price 
change that is well within the magnitude of changes 
seen in the last decade‖ (Busse et. al. 2008).  Kurani 
and Turrentine‘s contention that 
―consumers…engage in a limited or bounded type of 
economically rational decision making‖ doesn‘t hold 
up as well since buyers of small cars seem to be quite 
rational (Kurani and Turrentine 2004).  
Furthermore, if a consumer understands that a 
vehicle will use a large amount of gasoline, but 
purchases said vehicle anyway during a time of high 
nominal fuel prices, said input prices are not 
deterring the person from the purchase and so these 
prices would have little explanatory power over said 
purchase.  It is worth noting that since small car 
sales respond positively to higher gas prices while 
sales of large cars are statistically indeterminate 
against fuel prices, some substitution may be 
occurring even if the model used in this study did 
not detect it.  Cars are not inexpensive goods, which 
makes the market for them much more finite and 
limited than, say, the market for chewing gum.  If 
consumers are definitively purchasing more of one 
type of vehicle (smaller cars) then the sales have to 
be subtracted from someplace else in the market 
(larger vehicles), unless one creates a theory that 
high gas prices brought in a whole new crop of 
consumers who bought all the small cars (but 
weren‘t active in the market before the fuel price 
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surge), leaving sales of larger cars unchanged.  This 
seems highly improbable, so while no firm statistical 
evidence was found for substitution, it is unwise to 
assert that it did not take place based solely on this 
model‘s not finding any.  Witt‘s 1997 work lends 
some credibility to the previous logical inference, as 
his conclusion states ―an increase in the price of 
petrol decreases demand for larger cars‖ (Witt 1997).  
It is important to note, though, that this study does 
not support Witt's work during the analyzed time 
period as no negative relationship between fuel 
prices and sales of larger vehicles was observed. 
 
It is also possible to assert that fuel prices are better 
for explaining the sale of smaller vehicles than larger 
ones.  As to why, there are many possible 
explanations.  One involves selection bias—those 
who purchase smaller vehicles care more about fuel 
prices in the first place and this is a demonstration of 
that attitude.  Another may revolve around vehicle 
price since smaller vehicles tend to be priced lower 
(a Focus is cheaper than an F150 if the trim is 
comparable, since it takes fewer materials to build a 
physically smaller vehicle).  Though this is a rough 
guess on ―small is always less expensive than large‖ 
since there was no vehicle pricing in this study, as a 
general rule the more expensive the vehicle, the 
lower the explanatory power of fuel prices.  This 
supports a study mentioned by Kurani and 
Turrentine, which said ―In general, the higher the 
price of the vehicle, the less important is fuel 
economy‖ so it can be inferred that fuel prices matter 
little to the purchasers of luxury vehicles such as the 
Cadillac Escalade (standard and ESV) whose beta 
coefficients against fuel prices were positive (Kurani 
and Turrentine 2004).   
 
VII. Policy Implications 
 
This paper can be interpreted as qualified support 
for high fuel taxes.  It is a definite conclusion that 
sales of small vehicles rise with the price of gas, so 
overall fuel economy should increase under a 
situation where fuel is taxed heavily as people try to 
avoid the tax by using less fuel (by buying more fuel-
efficient vehicles).  What is missing is definitive 
statistical proof that these smaller car sales are 
eating into the total number of larger vehicles sold, 
as discussed in the Conclusion.  There is another 
subject which merits discussion at this point.  CAFE 
standards have affected driver safety since the 
mandate for greater fuel economy has led to lighter 
vehicles (Yun 2002).  The quickest method for 
getting more miles per gallon is to decrease the 
amount of weight the engine has to move around.  
The highest recorded EPA mileage in a gasoline non-
hybrid vehicle was the 1989 Honda CRX at 50MPG, 
but that was due mostly to its lack of features such as 
air conditioning, passenger compartment 
reinforcements and the like (Gold 2006).  In the 
modern day, Ford ―ran a computer simulation on 
what would happen to the mileage of a Ford Focus 
small car if you built it entirely out of lightweight 
aluminum‖ and found ―fuel economy on this 
fabulous Focus went from 35mpg to 50mpg‖ 
(Naughton 2008).  The downside is that machining 
the vehicle from aluminum would cost $50,000, ―not 
a sum the typical economy-car buyer is willing to 
pay‖ (Naughton 2008).  As of the writing of this 
paper, the same fuel economy can be had for half 
this price in the form of a 2010 Toyota Prius Hybrid 
(Edmunds.com 2009).  Imagine what an aluminum 
Prius would be capable of!  Making cars lighter does 
save fuel, but there is a trade-off in vehicle safety.  
Larger cars tend to ―crash better‖ since there is more 
steel to get in the way of an oncoming vehicle and 
stop it from smashing the occupants of the vehicle it 
is hitting.  However, the ―lightening‖ of the United 
States vehicle fleet has not had nearly as grim of 
consequences as one might think.  An empirical 
study by John Yun shows CAFE standards can be 
directly credited for a 6.11% net decrease in accident 
fatalities (Yun 2002 p260-270).  This is because 
consumers engage in so-called ―offsetting behavior,‖ 
summed up as in terms of safety thus: ―regulations 
do reduce the probability of death given an accident, 
but drivers offset this gain with more risky driving‖ 
(Yun 2002).  Yun applies this same principle to the 
supposedly-less-safe vehicles produced under CAFE 
and finds though vehicles are lighter, drivers in 
aggregate are more careful because of this, leading to 
a decrease in annual fatalities.  It appears people 
who consider, consciously or subconsciously, fuel 
prices in vehicle purchases are willing to buy lighter, 
supposedly-less-safe vehicles.  Fuel economy 
standards are not harmful market distortions like 
some opponents claim, since it appears there is a 
class of people for which fuel prices and economy are 
important who will gladly buy the smaller, ―less safe‖ 
cars which are influenced by the Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy standard. 
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